Hello,
In addition to what David says, my informed lay
person's understanding of encryption tells me that the
security issue here has to do with managing risk. In
the end, is is a judgement call as to whether the risk
is acceptable to most people.
Thanks, Ed Kennedy
--- David Mertz <voting-project@gnosis.cx> wrote:
> On Feb 22, 2005, at 3:27 PM, Paul Kinzelman wrote:
> > But I can take the code, insert my insidious
> > fraudulent code, and update the hash code, then
> release the
> > CDROM with my fraudulent code to unsuspecting
> precinct people,
> > for instance, and the hash code will check.
>
> Well, in a word, 'No'.
>
> The hash code[*] isn't just distributed on a slip of
> paper taped to the
> CD. A given version of the OVC software will have a
> known and
> published hash. That hash would be published on
> websites, newspapers,
> etc., and any CD poll workers got that lacked that
> published hash will
> be deemed no-good.
>
> [*] I would have said SHA-1 three days ago, but now
> that algorithm has
> been broken by the same brilliant Chinese team who
> broke MD5
>
> But actually, we've been through this quite a bit in
> the archives.
> We'll use Liam's StrongBox Linux (or something much
> like it) which
> includes a whole toolchain of all the "right* crypto
> procedures.
> Virtual disk images for different software sets
> (voting station, audio,
> tabulation, etc), bootable from CD, key layers for
> public key
> verification, and so on, StrongBox does all this
> sort of stuff.
>
> _______________________________________________
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> arthur@openvotingconsortium.org
>
=====
-- 10777 Bendigo Cove San Diego, CA 92126-2510 Work for the common good. _______________________________________________ OVC discuss mailing lists Send requests to subscribe or unsubscribe to arthur@openvotingconsortium.org ================================================================== = The content of this message, with the exception of any external = quotations under fair use, are released to the Public Domain ==================================================================Received on Sun Feb 27 17:17:09 2005
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