As written this is a really minimal bill. It doesn't require a formal public review process (only disclosure), it doesn't require the computation of checksums on precisely the version of the code that makes it through final review, it doesn't empower citizens to check that the code loaded into the machines on election day exactly matches the code that made it through final review, and it doesn't mandate either parallel testing or random inspections. It still represents progress over what we've got -- as long as legislators don't get the idea that it "fixes" all the extant problems with e-voting systems. You should make it clear that this bill is the first step toward improving e-voting security, not the last one.Here's what I got so far. If you want something different, please do one of two things 1) Create your own version ... if it seems decent, I'll submit that too. 2) suggest changes, edits, additions, etc. Obviously, I flunked by self-imposed deadline of last Monday .. the hard deadline is fast approaching, so if you want to have some input on this, better get it out here right away....
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