Ed,
I would say that there should be no known errors. That
all anomolies should be accounted for and that the
software and process should be designed to be fail-safe
to allow humans to identify and diagnose problems.
Fault diagnostics are at the heart of good engineering
and robust systems.
Therefore - at the point the election result is
pronounced there should be no known errors. In
addition - notice that elections are pronounced where
the result can be determined beyond reasonable
doubt - eg - if one candidate has received sufficient
votes so that it is mathematically impossible for their
opponents to exceed that total; and where the
election officials are able to determine this directly.
Anyway - what the Trusted Logic Voting (TLV) is
looking to do is provide that level of precision -
by giving three distinct and separate records during
the voting process - that can be cross-referenced.
Most importantly this is a 100% audit built-in so
that every vote counted has been corroborated
by three separate chains of auditable records. If
any of the three record chains does not match - then
this triggers action to determine why and remediate
accordingly.
DW
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Received on Thu Jun 30 23:17:09 2005
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