On 5/3/05, David Mertz <voting-project@gnosis.cx> wrote:
>
> I've remarked frequently before that this is what's wrong with the
> VoteHere approach (even if they were to genuinely open the code, rather
> than hide behind pseudo-open NDAs and the like). People with PhD's in
> the right field of math might well by happy with all the "provable"
> properties of fancy N-of-M and knapsack algorithms, zero-knowledge
> proofs, and all that stuff. I know more about that stuff than most
> people--probably more than most people with math or CS PhD's, in
> fact--but I still don't know quite enough to *really* understand the
> ins-and-outs of VoteHere type stuff.
Just a side note for all you crypto-geeks out there... two colleagues
of mine (and a prof.) here at Berkeley, Naveen Sastry, Chris Karlof
and David Wagner, have recently penned a critique of VoteHere and
Chaum's crypto schemes that was accepted to USENIX security this year.
When they have a publicly-distributable version, I'll send a pointer
(it does a good job of explaining the two schemes and critques them
from a systems approach.). -Joe
-- Joseph Lorenzo Hall UC Berkeley, SIMS PhD Student <http://pobox.com/~joehall/> blog: <http://pobox.com/~joehall/nqb2/> This email is written in [markdown][]; an easily-readable and parseable text format. [markdown]: http://daringfireball.net/projects/markdown/ _______________________________________________ OVC discuss mailing lists Send requests to subscribe or unsubscribe to arthur@openvotingconsortium.org ================================================================== = The content of this message, with the exception of any external = quotations under fair use, are released to the Public Domain ==================================================================Received on Tue May 31 23:17:14 2005
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